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The behaviour of poker players and sports gamblers has been shown to change after winning or losing a
signiﬁcant amount of money on a single hand. In this paper, we explore whether there are changes in ex-
perts’ behaviour when performing judgmental adjustments to statistical forecasts and, in particular, examine
the impact of ‘big losses’. We deﬁne a big loss as a judgmental adjustment that signiﬁcantly decreases the
forecasting accuracy compared to the baseline statistical forecast. In essence, big losses are directly linked
with wrong direction or highly overshooting judgmental overrides. Using relevant behavioural theories, we
empirically examine the effect of such big losses on subsequent judgmental adjustments exploiting a large
multinational data set containing statistical forecasts of demand for pharmaceutical products, expert adjust-
ments and actual sales. We then discuss the implications of our ﬁndings for the effective design of forecasting
support systems, focusing on the aspects of guidance and restrictiveness.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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M1. Introduction
Accurate product demand forecasting is important to companies
as forecasts are used in decisions relating to inventory control, pro-
duction planning, purchasing, logistics, cash ﬂow planning and other
aspects of the business. A typical forecasting process includes pre-
processing and analysis of the data, which are usually in the form of
time series, extrapolating the series with a suitable statistical method
(Petropoulos, Makridakis, Assimakopoulos, & Nikolopoulos, 2014),
post-processing the statistical forecasts and monitoring and evalu-
ating the outputs. The latter acts as feedback to inform the calcula-
tion of subsequent sets of forecasts. Often, the forecasting process is
implemented within specialised forecasting software. This paper fo-
cuses on the third, post-processing, stage of the forecasting process,
and more speciﬁcally on the judgmental interventions on statistical
forecasts that are typically performed by demand planners and man-
agers (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007b). Such interventions are common,
with Fildes, Goodwin, Lawrence, and Nikolopoulos (2009) reporting
that 91 percent of the forecasts examined in one organisation were
subject to judgmental adjustments. Franses and Legerstee (2009) re-
ported similar ﬁndings.∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44(0)2920875505.
E-mail address: PetropoulosF@cardiff.ac.uk (F. Petropoulos).
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ds, like exponential smoothing or ARIMA models, are primarily
ade for four reasons. First, managers attempt to incorporate into
he forecasts the expected impact of forthcoming special events,
uch as promotional activities, strikes, or the launch of a competit-
ng new product (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007a). Arguably, more formal
ethods that include external regressors could sometimes be used
or this purpose (Huang, Fildes, & Soopramanien, 2014). However,
imitations in the available quantitative data and the complexity of
he models often renders judgmental adjustment as the only practi-
al approach. Second, demand planners may tend to change statis-
ical forecasts in order to be in-line with budgeting or politically-
elated targets set by senior managers (Fildes & Goodwin, 2007b).
or example, in a ﬁeld study Lawrence, O’Connor, and Edmundson
2000) questioned whether forecast accuracy was the primary objec-
ive of their company-based forecasters and suggested that their fore-
asts were heavily inﬂuenced by political choices within the company
ramework. Despite this, a recent survey by Fildes and Petropoulos
2015) showed that accuracy is generally themost important driver in
he forecasting process, conﬁrming earlier studies (for example see:
cCarthy, Davis, Golicic, & Mentzer, 2006). Third, managers may ad-
ust in order to gain a sense of ownership of the forecasts, possibly
s a result of a lack of trust in the statistical methods, which they
ay regard as “black-boxes” (Önkal & Gönül, 2005). Lastly, humans
re liable to confuse the signal with the noise (Harvey, 1995) andr the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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&ntroduce unnecessary judgmental adjustments as the result of per-
eived systematic changes that were not captured by the statistical
ethods (Goodwin & Fildes, 1999).
Previous studies of demand forecasting have focused on the ef-
ciency of judgmental adjustments and the circumstances under
hich judgmental manipulation of statistical forecasts might be use-
ul. Some studies proposed actions and strategies to prevent unneces-
ary interventions or to optimally combine statistics with judgment.
ee Lawrence, Goodwin, O’Connor, and Onkal (2006) and Leitner and
eopold-Wildburger (2011) for reviews of progress in judgmental
orecasting. Recently, researchers in behavioural operational research
Hämäläinen, Luoma, & Saarinen, 2013) have focused on ﬁnding links
etween forecasting performance and experts’ behaviour (for exam-
le see: de Bruijn & Franses, 2012). Similarly, research on corporate
arnings forecasting has examined the behavioural determinants of
bserved biases (Ramnath, Rock, & Shane, 2008). However, while de-
and forecasters usually have many products to forecast and obtain
apid feedback on accuracy, earnings analysts in contrast tend to fo-
us more intensively on particular companies and observe the out-
omes of their forecasts less frequently.
While a number of factors may affect forecasters’ behaviour, the
ccurrence of a signiﬁcant event or outcome in the previous pe-
iod may be particularly inﬂuential. In an interesting study by Smith,
evere, and Kurtzman (2009), poker players were found to change
heir strategy after signiﬁcantwins or losses. Big losses were followed
y playing less cautiously, with players tending to be more aggres-
ive compared to their behaviour after big wins. Similar behaviours
ave been found in sports gambling (Xu & Harvey, 2014) and in ﬁ-
ancial markets (Coval & Shumway, 2005; Garvey, Murphy, & Wu,
007). Here we investigate whether forecasters’ behaviour in relation
o judgmental adjustments is affected by the experience of previous
oor interventions and, if the effect is damaging to accuracy, how this
ight be mitigated. Speciﬁcally, we address the following research
uestions:
RQ1 How do adjustments to statistical forecasts that lead to large
losses affect experts’ behaviour in performing interventions for
the very next period?
RQ2 If judgmental adjustments are unduly inﬂuenced by large
losses in the previous period what corrective actions would be
likely to result in improved forecasting performance?
In order to deal with these two questions, we have to deﬁne what
big loss in a judgmentally adjusted forecast is. So, after a review
f the background literature in Section 2, in Section 3 we propose a
ew way for classifying and measuring the quality of judgmental ad-
ustments. Sections 4 and 5 attempt to answer the research questions
y analysing a large empirical data set of judgmental adjustments to
emand forecasts made by managers in a multinational company. Fi-
ally, the last section summarises the ﬁndings, offering conclusions
s to their managerial implications.
. Background literature
A few decades ago, most researchers discouraged managers from
aking judgmental adjustments to statistical forecasts because it
as believed that theywould generally damage accuracy (Armstrong,
985; Carbone, Andersen, Corriveau, & Corson, 1983). These re-
earchers found evidence that judgment was associated with a
ide range of biases including over-optimism, anchoring (Eroglu &
roxton, 2010), overconﬁdence (Blattberg & Hoch, 1990; Kottemann,
avis, & Remus, 1994), inconsistency, and confusion of the signal with
he noise (Eggleton, 1982; O’Connor, Remus, & Griggs, 1993).
Mathews and Diamantopoulos were the ﬁrst to show empir-
cally through a series of company-based studies (Mathews &
iamantopoulos, 1986; 1989; 1990) that “forecast manipulation” can
ead to improvements in accuracy. Interestingly, they showed thatorecasters are more likely to adjust the forecasts that would have
roduced the largest forecast errors had the statistical forecasts re-
ained unrevised. Other researchers have provided further evidence
n the eﬃcacy of judgmentally adjusted forecasts inmacroeconomics
Donihue, 1993; McNees, 1990; Turner, 1990), accounting earnings
Brown, 1988) and business forecasting (Vere & Griﬃths, 1995;Wolfe
Flores, 1990). Syntetos, Nikolopoulos, and Boylan (2010) showed
hat in addition to the improvements in performance as measured by
raditional error metrics, judgmental adjustments of demand fore-
asts also result in signiﬁcant reductions in inventory costs. The com-
on factor in these studies is that when important domain knowl-
dge is missing from the statistical forecasts, this can be integrated
ﬃciently into the operational forecasts by applying judgmental ad-
ustments to improve performance. However, two key elements af-
ecting the success of an intervention are the reliability and impor-
ance of themissing information (Goodwin & Fildes, 1999) and the re-
uirement that humans should not discount reliable statistical fore-
asts (Donihue, 1993).
Despite these ﬁndings, there is considerable evidence from both
eld and laboratory studies that relatively accurate statistical fore-
asts are frequently judgmentally adjusted without reference to do-
ain knowledge or its reliability (Fildes et al., 2009; Goodwin,
000). A particularly salient cue that the forecasters are likely to be
romptedwith is the latest error and this raises the question: to what
xtent are such adjustments a behavioural response to an error re-
ulting from a judgmental adjustment in the previous period, and in
articular, a large error, as this is likely to be especially prominent?
or example, do forecasters have a propensity to make a large ad-
ustment after a previous adjustment has led to a large error, even
hen they have no reliable domain knowledge to justify such an
ntervention?
The literature suggests a number of possible behavioural reactions
o an adjustment in the previous period that has led to a large er-
or. There are two reasons why the subsequent adjustment might be
arge: a) greater risk taking behaviour by the forecaster and b) over-
eaction to outcome feedback. Smith et al. (2009) found that, after
arge losses in games of poker, players engaged in more aggressive
nd riskier gambles (see also Xu & Harvey, 2014). They largely at-
ributed this to the break-even hypothesis whereby, after sustaining
large loss, the players were prepared to take risks in an attempt to
ancel out the loss. In demand forecasting a large adjustment may
e a sign of risk taking behaviour. To make a large adjustment fol-
owing a previous damaging intervention may be a brave action that
isks further compounding both ﬁnancial costs and damage to the
orecaster’s reputation. Signiﬁcantly, it involves an act of commission.
hile, not making an adjustment when it was warranted would risk
ne being guilty of an act of omission, there is evidence that an er-
oneous act of commission is seen as worse than an erroneous act of
mission (Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991).
However, decisions in poker games differ from forecasting judg-
ents in several ways so the break-even hypothesis might not apply
n the forecasting context. First, the concept of losses and gains dif-
ers between the two concepts. In the context of demand forecasting
e deﬁne a gain as a improvement in accuracy as a result of an ad-
ustment, while a loss is a reduction in accuracy. Thus large losses are
o be distinguished from large forecast errors. A forecaster’s adjust-
ent may actually lead to a gain in accuracy compared to the statis-
ical forecast, but a large error may still result. Second, the outcomes
f poker games are independent while observations in time series
re usually dependent. Intervals between poker games are likely to
e shorter than the periods between successive demand forecasts so
hat immediate emotional reactions to poor judgments are likely to
e less prevalent in demand forecasting. Also, traditional poker play-
rs are likely to be engaged in one game at a time while most de-
and forecasters will have the task of forecasting many series (Fildes
Goodwin, 2007b) over long periods so that a large forecast error in
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Wrong direction Undershoot Overshoot
Fig. 1. Types of adjustments in judgmental forecasting (solid line: actual outcome; dash line, black square: statistical forecast; unﬁlled square: expert forecast).
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cone series at one point in time will be less prominent than the con-
sequences of a poor judgment in poker.
In particular, errors in forecasts differ from ﬁnancial losses and
gains so that adjustment signiﬁcantly improves accuracywill not nec-
essarily compensate for a preceding intervention that reduced ac-
curacy. For example, experts’ reputations are more easily lost than
gained (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). While prospect theory (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992) suggests that people do tend to risk even further
losses to try to negate current loss, the idea of forecasters making a
large reckless adjustment to a forecast for an individual product in
order to recover their reputation, because their previous adjustment
had signiﬁcantly damaged accuracy, seems less plausible. Hence, de-
mand forecasting seems unlikely to be associated with the break-
even hypothesis.
Nevertheless, there are still reasons to believe that forecasters
may tend to make large adjustments following large errors and these
reasons are related to the direction of adjustment. First, it is known
that forecasters have a tendency to overreact to outcome feedback,
which will, in part, reﬂect the noise in a time series (Lawrence et al.,
2006). For example, an outcome that is signiﬁcantly higher than a
forecastmay be interpreted as a sign that an upwardmovement in the
signal has occurred even whenmuch of the error can be attributed to
noise. As a consequence, the subsequent forecast may be subject to
considerable upwards adjustment. This causes it to be too high and
a large error in one direction is followed by a large error in the op-
posite direction. Where the initial large error largely results from the
forecaster’s adjustment then the forecaster will incur a loss (as de-
ﬁned above). Assuming that forecasters receive outcome feedback on
the success or otherwise of their adjustments then large adjustments
following large losses would be manifested in a tendency for large
adjustments to be made in the same direction as the previous large
error so that a positive adjustment will follow a positive error (where
error = actual − forecast) and vice versa.
Alternatively, forecasters may persist in making large adjustments
in the opposite direction to the previous large error. For example, a
signiﬁcant upwards adjustment, resulting in a negative error and a
large loss may still be followed by a large upwards adjustment. This
behaviour is likely to incur similarly large errors in the same direc-
tion. This may in part relate to the gambler’s fallacy where chance
events are perceived to be self-correcting (Smith et al., 2009). For ex-
ample, a forecaster might expect that a run of lower than expected
sales ﬁgures that are judged to be due to random factors will be bal-
anced in the future by higher sales because ‘on average half the sales
are lower and half are higher than expected’. The probable result
would be a persistent tendency to over-forecast as the ‘compensat-
ing’ higher-than-expected sales are awaited.
However, there may be other reasons for the persistency of large
errors of the same sign after big losses including an unforeseen de-
lay in an expected special event and, when decisions are associated
with asymmetric loss, a confusion of forecasts with decisions. For ex-
ample, this may occur when, in order to meet customer service tar-
gets, decisions are made to hold inventory at two standard deviationsbove expected sales but these decisions are represented as fore-
asts of expected demand (Fildes et al., 2009). There is also evidence
hat people are reluctant to modify a previous act of commission and
ersist in pursuing the same action (Staw, 1976). This can occur de-
pite evidence that continuing the action is counterproductive (Lim
O’Connor, 1995). Persistent errors of the same sign represent a re-
ection of outcome feedback and can result from a belief that what
appened in the last period is irrelevant.
Of course, there are reasons why big losses might tend to be fol-
owed by relatively small adjustments. Following the poker analogy
Smith et al., 2009), a large loss may have negative effects on a fore-
aster’s conﬁdence in his or her ability to contribute to forecast accu-
acy for a given product. This would also lead to a propensity to avoid
large adjustment in the subsequent period. In other cases a big loss
n the previous period may have been associated with an inability to
orecast the effects of a special event. In the subsequent period, when
o special event is anticipated, an adjustment might not be consid-
red to be necessary.
On balance, the literature suggests the following hypothesis:
H1 Experts are more likely to make large judgmental adjustments
to forecasts in periods following big losses.
H1 implies that forecasters are likely to pay attention to the lat-
st loss and this is also fairly supported by responses to a question-
aire administered by Boulaksil and Franses (2009). Here the experts
f the pharmaceutical company (on which our later analysis is based)
ndicated that they review their past forecasting performance when
aking new forecasts. Also, there is some evidence that these experts
ompare the performance of the statistical forecasts with that of their
wn forecasts. As we have seen, outcome feedback will be expected
o cause forecasters to adjust in the direction suggested by their pre-
ious error. Hence, we have:
H2 Following a big loss, experts are more likely to make adjust-
ments in same direction as the previous large error.
The preceding hypotheses suggest that, following a large loss,
arge adjustments will be made based largely on the basis of out-
ome feedback. Since, this feedback relates only to the latest period
nd is contaminated by noise it is an unreliable basis for these large
djustments which are therefore likely to be seriously detrimental to
orecast accuracy. Hence we hypothesise:
H3 Big losses are more likely in the period following a big loss.
. A newmeasure for understanding judgmental adjustments
.1. Types of judgmental adjustments and their effects on accuracy
Generally, the effects of judgmental adjustments can be divided
nto three types, graphically depicted in Fig. 1. Wrong direction ad-
ustments are interventions in the opposite direction compared to
he sign of the deviation between real outcome and statistical fore-
ast. These adjustments always lead to inferior accuracy in the ﬁnal
F. Petropoulos et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 249 (2016) 842–852 845
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Table 1
Linkage of β values with different types of adjustments.
Type of adjustment Value of β Effect on accuracy,
compared to no adjustment
XL overshoot β > 3 Big loss
L overshoot 2 < β ≤ 3 Loss
Overshoot β = 2 No gain nor loss
Overshoot 1 < β < 2 Gain
Spot-on β = 1 Maximum gain
Undershoot 0 < β < 1 Gain
No adjustment β = 0 No gain nor loss
Wrong direction −1 ≤ β < 0 Loss
L wrong direction β < −1 Big loss
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uorecast compared to the statistical forecast. Undershoots refer to re-
isions that are to the correct direction, but not enough to fully ex-
lain the true outcome. Despite that, undershoots always improve
orecast accuracy, as adjustments of this type decrease the differ-
nce between statistics and reality. Lastly, overshoots are interven-
ions to the correct direction, but of magnitude larger than the ‘op-
imal’. Overshoots may lead to either improvements or deteriora-
ion in forecasting performance, depending on the magnitude of the
djustment.
.2. The β coeﬃcient in judgmental adjustments
In this study we are interested in analysing the behaviour of ex-
erts in performing adjustments directly after revisions that resulted
n big losses. So, we have to ﬁrst answer the question ‘what is a
ig loss?’. However, to the best of our knowledge the deﬁnition of
big losses’ is absent from the literature. Arguably, it could be linked
o wrong direction and overshoot adjustments, but a non-arbitrary
uantitative measure of the type, quality and magnitude of a sin-
le judgmental adjustment is needed. In this section, we deﬁne a
ew measure for understanding judgmental revisions of statistical
orecasts. This new measure enables us to analyse the behaviour of
xperts when performing judgmental adjustments, focusing on the
ases after big losses.
Let us assume that the statistical output of a forecastingmethod is
nbiased. This means that the cumulative signed forecast error over
large number of periods is zero. In other words, any optimistic sta-
istical point forecasts are balanced off by other pessimistic ones, and
ice versa. Let us also assume that there is a deviation between the
rue outcome and the statistical prediction. In essence, this deviation,
r statistical forecast error, is to be reconciled by an ideal judgmen-
al adjustment. In other words, the aim of a judgmental adjustment is
o alter the statistical output by the construction of an expert forecast
hichwill be closer or even equal to the actual value. Given the afore-
entioned assumptions, we can regard the quality of a judgmental
djustment as a percentage of the deviation between the statistical
orecast and the actual outcome.
We deﬁne a scale-free measure for identifying the type, quality,
nd magnitude of a judgmental adjustment:
t = EFt − SFt
Yt − SFt =
FDt
RDt
(1)
here:
• Yt: actual value at time t.
• SFt: statistical forecast at time t.
• EFt: expert forecast at time t produced given the statistical
baseline (SFt). It may be equal to SFt. Most usually, this is used
as the ﬁnal (operational) forecast.
• RDt: real difference that needs to be reconciled or difference
between actual and statistical forecast (Yt − SFt ).
• FDt: forecasts’ difference or difference between expert forecast
and statistical forecast (EFt − SFt ). This is the actual judgmental
adjustment.
This measure gives the signed ratio of the judgmental adjustment
o the error in the statistical forecast. A positive sign denotes an ad-
ustment in the correct direction, while negative β values refer to
rong direction adjustments. The interpretation of this measure is
ery intuitive. For example, β = 0.5 means that only 50 percent of
he statistical forecast error has been removed by the judgmental ad-
ustment, β = 1 refers to a perfect adjustment (100 percent of the
tatistical forecast error is removed by judgment), while β = 1.5 in-
icates that judgment is over-compensating (by 50 percent) for the
tatistical forecast’s error. A linkage of β values with different types
f adjustments is provided in Table 1. We also provide a translation ofhe different values of β with the effect of the adjustment on forecast
ccuracy, when compared to no adjustment.
While some of the critical values derive directly from the deﬁni-
ion of this new measure, the values of β for which an adjustment is
ranslated to a ‘big loss’ rather than just a loss may differ in various
pplications. However, we opt for retaining the symmetry of the crit-
cal values and therefore propose that a big loss may be regarded as
he result of an adjustment that deviates by more than 200 percent
rom a perfect adjustment (i.e. has a β value of less than−1 or greater
han 3).
A limitation of this measure is that it does not distinguish be-
ween upwards and downwards adjustments, which proved to be
f some importance in other studies (Fildes et al., 2009; Trapero,
edregal, Fildes, & Kourentzes, 2013). A further limitation is that β is
ndeﬁned in the extreme case that the statistical forecast coincides
ith the actual value (the error of the statistical forecast is zero). In
his case, we argue that a no-adjustment is the optimal behaviour
maximum gain), resulting in a β coeﬃcient of 1. If an adjustment
as been made, then the β coeﬃcient will be inﬁnite, denoting that
his adjustment signiﬁcantly deteriorates the accuracy (compared to
he statistical forecast), so it is a big loss.
.3. Links to the literature
Let us now see how this new measure links to the existing liter-
ture on judgmental adjustments. Franses and Legerstee (2011a) ex-
mine the effectiveness of linearly combining the statistical and ex-
ert forecasts. So, they suggest that a ﬁnal forecast at time t (FFt) may
e derived as:
Ft = αtEFt + (1 − αt )SFt ⇔ (2)
Ft = SFt + αt (EFt − SFt ) ⇔ (3)
Ft = SFt + αtFDt ⇔ (4)
t − FFt = Yt − SFt − αtFDt (5)
here αt is the weight to be assigned on the expert forecast at time t.
bviously, the weight to be assigned on the statistical forecast should
e 1 − αt , so that the summation of the two weights is unity.
Letting Yt − FFt being the forecast error at time t (et), Eq. (5)
ives:
t = RDt − αt FDt (6)
From Eq. (6), for et = 0:
t = RDt
FDt
= 1
βt
(7)
So, the optimal weights for combining the statistical forecast (SFt)
nd the expert forecast (EFt) in order to end up with a zero forecast
rror are 1 − 1
βt
and 1
βt
, respectively. For example, if β t reﬂects a sit-
ation where only 0.4 of a required upwards adjustment has been
846 F. Petropoulos et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 249 (2016) 842–852
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Fig. 2. Example of a time series and the respective information contained in the database.
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tmade, a weighted average of the statistical and expert forecast using
respective weights of −1.5 and 2.5 would yield a perfectly accurate
forecast. It is worth mentioning that the optimal weights, along with
the β values, are likely to change over time.
Hyndman and Koehler (2006) deﬁne the relative error as the ratio
of the forecast error deriving from amethod whose performance is to
be measured divided by the error of a benchmark method. For exam-
ple, the relative absolute error (RAE) incurred for a statistical forecast,
SFt, for time t can be deﬁned as:
RAEt = |Yt − SFt |∣∣Yt − SFbt
∣
∣ =
|et |∣
∣ebt
∣
∣ (8)
where SFbt and e
b
t refer to the statistical forecast and the respective
forecast error of the benchmark method. Following Davydenko and
Fildes (2013), we can replace the benchmark method in Eq. (8) with
the pure statistical forecast and the method in the numerator with
the expert forecast (the one containing the judgmental adjustment).
By doing this, we can directly compare the performance of the expert
forecast relatively to the statistical forecast:
RAEt =
∣
∣eEFt
∣
∣
∣
∣eSFt
∣
∣ =
∣
∣
∣
Yt − EFt
Yt − SFt
∣
∣
∣ (9)
However, Eq. (9) can be rewritten as:
RAEt =
∣
∣
∣
∣
Yt − SFt − (EFt − SFt )
Yt − SFt
∣
∣
∣
∣ =
∣
∣
∣1 − FDt
RDt
∣
∣
∣ = |1 − βt | (10)
So, the β is also linked with the relative absolute error of the ex-
pert forecast, using the statistical forecast as the benchmark. This is
an important property which provides a direct relationship of the β
with a recently introduced error measure (Average RelativeMean Ab-
solute Error or AvgRelMAE, Davydenko & Fildes, 2013) for evaluating
judgmentally adjusted forecasts across different periods andmultiple
time series.
4. Analysing expert forecasts
4.1. The data
In order to examine the behaviour of experts in performing judg-
mental adjustments after big losses, we consider a database that was
initially introduced in a study by Franses and Legerstee (2009) and
was afterwards used in other studies by the same researchers (for ex-
ample see Franses & Legerstee, 2010; 2011a; 2011b; 2013; Legerstee
& Franses, 2014). This database contains the monthly sales of 1,101
pharmaceutical stock keeping units (SKUs). The SKUs come from 37
countries and were the responsibility of 50 different managers.
The length of each series is 25 months, spanning from October
2004 to October 2006. Besides the actual sales (Y ), in each period the
database also contains the statistical (SF) and expert forecast (EF).owever, missing values exist for some periods in speciﬁc SKUs. We
ocus on the 774 time series where the triplet Y, SF , and EF is avail-
ble for all periods. SF is automatically provided by some forecast-
ng software which utilises historical information (lagged sales) and
ndividually (per series) select an optimal method from a set of al-
ernatives (such as Box-Jenkins or Holt-Winters). The method itself
nd the optimised parameters may change across origins. For more
etails, please see Franses and Legerstee (2009, 2013).
A typical time series from the database is presented in Fig. 2. This
hows all different types of judgmental adjustments. For example,
ndershoots occurred at periods 7 and 17, overshoots are observed
t periods 4 and 6, while wrong-direction adjustments are recorded
or periods 3 and 5.
.2. Analysis of all judgmental adjustments
As the target is to identify the effect of big losses in the very next
udgmental adjustment, we ﬁrst calculate the percentage of judg-
ental adjustments of each type identiﬁed in Table 1. The analysis
s performed for the periods t = 2,3, . . . , 25, leaving out of the ob-
ervations for the very ﬁrst period. This is because periods with lag
ne will be used later to identify periods where judgmental adjust-
ents occurred after big losses. To simplify the analysis, we excluded
he limited number of cases where β = 0 (2 percent of the total
ases), indicating that no adjustments were made despite deviations
etween the actual values and statistical forecasts. So, the effective
ample for the current analysis contains more than 18,000 judgmen-
al adjustments (774 time series × 24 periods − 384 cases where
= 0). The cases where β ∈ (0, 1] are pooled together, creating the
undershoot or spot-on” group. Similarly, for β ∈ (1, 2] in the case of
mall overshoots.
The relative frequency (percentage of cases) of each type of ad-
ustment is depicted in Fig. 3. Undershoots (and spot-on) are the
ost common type of adjustments (36 percent of the cases), with
mall wrong direction adjustments being the second most common.
hese two categories together constitute 57 percent of the adjust-
ents. Thus, managers have a tendency to perform relatively small
djustments. So, in the majority of cases, the absolute magnitude of
he interventions is not enough to remove the difference between the
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Table 2
Size of adjustment following different values of β .
βt−1 (type of adjustment at t − 1)
Adjustment size at t L wrong direction Moderate loss or gain XL overshoot
βt−1 < −1 −1 ≤ βt−1 ≤ 3 βt−1 > 3
Small 1331 (−10.3 percent) 7075 (3.9 percent) 6901 (−20.1 percent)
Large 736 (0.2 percent) 3357 (−1.3 percent) 455 (8.9 percent)
Very large 8701 (15.6) 3165 (−7.4 percent) 5131 (19.2 percent)
Percentage differences of the realised frequencies compared to the expected ones, assuming independence, are in brackets.
1 Largest contributions to chi-squared statistic.
Table 3
Transition matrix for previous and current β values.
βt−1 (type of adjustment at t − 1)
β t (type of adjustment at t) L wrong direction Moderate loss or gain XL overshoot
βt−1 < −1 −1 ≤ βt−1 ≤ 3 βt−1 > 3
L wrong direction 6221 (23.3 percent) 2018 (−9.4 percent) 314 (14.3 percent)
βt < −1
Moderate loss or gain 1978 (−10.7 percent) 10475 (3.2 percent) 1115 (−10.9 percent)
βt ∈ [−1,0) ∪ (0,3]
XL overshoot 337 (20.0 percent) 1104 (−13.1 percent) 2291 (33.5 percent)
β t > 3
Percentage differences of the realised frequencies compared to the expected ones, assuming independence, are in brackets.
1 Largest contributions to chi-squared statistic.
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lctual outcome and the statistical forecast. This is a result that is con-
istent with ﬁndings in other studies (Fildes et al., 2009).
Only 49 percent of the adjustments lead to improvements in ac-
uracy (i.e. they are undershoots, spot-on adjustments or small over-
hoots). This is in line with previous studies on the same database,
here it was found that, when averaged across countries and cate-
ories of products, only in 43 percent of the cases expert forecasts
ere better than statistical ones (Franses & Legerstee, 2010). Hence,
or more than half of the cases adjustments to the statistical forecasts
esult in deterioration in accuracy. On top of that, in 25.4 percent of
ases the adjustments led to big losses (i.e. βs had values lower than
1 or greater than 3).
.3. Analysis of judgmental adjustments after big losses
We ﬁrst test H1 and investigate whether there is an association
etween the size of adjustment in a given period and whether or not
big loss occurred in the previous period. To control for different lev-
ls of volatility in the series we divided each absolute adjustment
y the standard deviation of the statistical forecasts. We then cat-
gorised these normalised adjustments as being small if they were
elow the median of all adjustments in the database, large if they
ere between the median and 75th percentile and very large if they
xceeded this percentile. Given that a few of the adjustments were
xtremely large, this categorisation led to a more robust analysis and
educed the inﬂuence of these extreme observations. Table 2 presents
he observed frequencies, where previous moderate losses and gains
−1 ≤ βt−1 ≤ 3) are pooled, so that big losses are kept distinct. Also,
he percentage differences of the realised frequencies compared to
he expected ones (assuming independence) divided by the realised
umbers are given in brackets. For example, far more very large ad-
ustments are observed in periods following an extra-large overshoot
hanwould be expected if adjustment behaviour in the second period
as independent of what happened in the ﬁrst.
When the chi-squared test of independence was applied to
able 2 χ2 = 116.6 with p < 0.0001 suggesting that βt−1 and the
ize of adjustment at t are dependent. Table 2 indicates that very large
djustments are more probable particularly after a very large over-
hoot in the previous period and also after a large wrong directiondjustment. Also, it is less likely that a small adjustment will occur
fter a big loss. This provides support for H1.
We next test H2 to see whether, following a big loss, the experts
djusted in the same direction as the previous forecast error. To in-
estigate this, the following mixed effects logistic regression equa-
ion was ﬁtted to the 18192 observations in the database. The estima-
ion of the model took into account that we have repeated measures
or each SKU. The two tailed p-values assume that Z = m
se(m)
follows
standard normal distribution, where m is the estimated coeﬃcient
nd se(m) is an estimate of its standard error.
n
(

1−
)
= −0.01 −0.84βLWt−1 −0.84βXLt−1 −0.10Lt −0.33VLt
− values : (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
here:
• : the probability that the adjustment at t has the same direc-
tion as the error at t − 1.
• βLW
t−1 = 1 if the loss at t − 1 resulted from a large wrong direc-
tion adjustment (i.e. β < −1), 0 otherwise.
• βXLt−1 = 1 if the loss at t − 1 resulted from a very large over-
shoot (i.e. β > 3), 0 otherwise.
• Lt = 1 if the adjustment at twas large, 0 otherwise.
• VLt = 1 if the adjustment at twas very large, 0 otherwise.
This logistic regression shows that the probability that the adjust-
ent is in the same direction as the previous error is signiﬁcantly re-
uced following large wrong direction adjustments, large overshoots
nd where the adjustment is large or very large. It suggests that H2
hould be rejected and indicates that after a large loss forecasters are
ore likely to persist in adjusting forecasts in the opposite direction
o that suggested by the error.
We next examine the consequences of this behaviour on losses
y examining the association between β t and βt−1. When the chi-
quared test of independencewas applied to Table 3χ2 = 183.7with
p < 0.0001 so there appeared to be a dependence between losses
n consecutive periods providing support for H3. It can be seen that
here is a higher probability of large wrong direction adjustments
hen a wrong direction adjustment has been made in the previous
eriod. Similarly, very large overshoots tend be more probable fol-
owing very large overshoots.
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Table 4
Association of previous β value with subsequent adjustment and consequences.
βt−1 (type of adjustment at t − 1)
Adjustment at t L wrong direction Moderate loss or gain XL overshoot
βt−1 < −1 −1 ≤ βt−1 ≤ 3 βt−1 > 3
Very large, contrary direction adjustment resulting in a big loss 3681 (46.2 percent) 6431 (−42.5 percent) 2151 (48.0 percent)
Does not meet all 3 conditions above 2569 (−6.6 percent) 12954 (2.1 percent) 1443 (−7.2 percent)
Percentage differences of the realised frequencies compared to the expected ones, assuming independence, are in brackets.
1 Largest contributions to chi-squared statistic.
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cTable 4 provides further insights. It shows the association between
βt−1 and instances of adjustments at t that are very large in size,
contrary to the direction of the previous error and result in another
big loss (i.e. a large wrong direction adjustment or a very large over-
shoot). When the chi-squared test of independence was applied to
Table 4 χ2 = 346.4 with p < 0.0001 indicating that such adjust-
ments are much more probable following a large wrong direction
adjustment or a very large overshoot. Taken together these results
support the notion that, following a large loss, forecasters are more
likely persist in making large adjustments in a direction contrary to
that suggested by their previous error and this behaviour is likely to
lead to a serious deterioration in forecast accuracy.
4.4. Discussion
The results presented in the previous subsection indicate that af-
ter a big loss forecasters have a tendency to make an adjustment for
the following period that is large and in a direction that is opposite
to that suggested by their previous error. For example, if they have
incurred a big loss by forecasting too high in the previous period they
are still more likely to make a large upwards adjustment in the fol-
lowing period, even though this behaviour increases the probability
of a second big loss. Thus, rather than overreacting to outcome feed-
back, the experts appear to be ignoring it. There are a number of pos-
sible explanations for this.
The ﬁrst possibility is that the forecasts are subject to asymmet-
ric loss. In the pharmaceutical industry being out-of-stock is more
serious than having surplus stocks, as holding costs of drugs are rela-
tively low so the forecasters may have an incentive to persist in mak-
ing upwards adjustments to statistical forecasts. An analysis of this
data set by Franses, Legerstee, and Paap (2011) concluded that there
was evidence that the experts’ forecasts were subject to asymmetric
loss. However, overall 57.8 percent of the adjustments to the statis-
tical forecasts were in the upwards direction so forecasts were fre-
quently lowered. Moreover, it seems unlikely that relatively rare very
large changes to the statistical forecasts would be made because of
asymmetric loss. Given that the same loss function would be likely
to apply to a series for long periods, asymmetric loss would be more
likely to lead to a pattern of consistent changes rather than the occa-
sional very large adjustment. Indeed, the loss functions identiﬁed by
Franses et al. (2011) would be consistent with moderate adjustments.
A second possibility is that the forecasters were suffering from the
gambler’s fallacy and expecting that a chance event that produced
unforeseen and exceptional sales in the previous period would be
‘balanced out’ by an exceptional sales movement in the opposite di-
rection in the next period. If this is the case we would expect that
the statistical forecast error in the period preceding a big loss would
be exceptionally high. In fact, the statistical forecast errors tended to
be slightly lower than average in the period preceding a big loss. The
mean absolute statistical forecast error, normalised by dividing by the
standard deviation of the statistical forecasts for each series, was 1.31
for all periods and 1.23 in the periods immediately preceding a big
loss.
A third possibility is that a special event that would have a
large impact on sales was known be occurring in the future but theiming of its effects was misjudged. If the effect of the event failed to
aterialise in one period then it might be expected to occur in the
ubsequent period instead or in the period after that. If this was the
ase then in the period after two consecutive periods of big losses we
ight expect the statistical forecast error to be higher as it failed to
orecast the special event when it ﬁnally occurred. Again there was
o support for this. In the periods after two big losses the normalised
ean absolute statistical forecast error was lower than the norm at
.11.
This leaves the possibility that the forecasters were prepared to
ake bold interventions on the basis of unreliable information or a
isinterpretation of information and that they were prepared to per-
ist in making large adjustments on this basis even when there was
vidence from the previous period that this had reduced forecast ac-
uracy and they had incurred a big loss. Their persistence in making
large wrong direction adjustment following an earlier such adjust-
ent suggests a resistance to recognising a step change in sales. This
ould indicate that information pointing to such a change was either
ot available or was discounted. Such behaviour might occur when
he initial large loss is simply attributed to a transient shock to the
ystem. Their persistence in making an adjustment that resulted in
large overshoot, following an earlier such adjustment, is consistent
ith an expectation of a step change in sales that is not forthcoming.
gain, this may reﬂect a lack of availability of reliable information or
he misinterpretation of such information.
If the forecasters’ judgments were being distorted by unreliable
nformation this would not be consistent with the results of a labora-
ory study by Remus, O’Connor, and Griggs (1998) which found that
udgmental forecasters were not necessarily misled by incorrect in-
ormation. However, in the Remus study people were supplied with
umours that suggested particular future movements in time series,
ut no reasons or arguments to support these possible movements
ere provided. In the ﬁeld there is likely to be a richer variety of
nformation and misinformation available to forecasters who have
he diﬃcult task of assessing its reliability, relevance and importance.
otivational and political factors may contribute to the misinterpre-
ation of information. For example, wishful thinking may lead to the
iscounting of negative information if an increase in sales is desired
Tyebjee, 1987). A desire to produce forecasts that are politically ac-
eptable to senior managers may have a similar effect on how infor-
ation is interpreted and whether it is discounted (Fildes & Hastings,
994).
The ﬁndings in Section 4.3 are insensitive to the values of the
hresholds for deﬁning big losses. A replication of the analysis using
s a threshold for big losses an adjustment that deviated bymore than
50 percent or 250 percent (instead of 200 percent) from a perfect ad-
ustment produced practically the same results. However, some of the
esults differed when the threshold was set to 100 percent, which is
quivalent to no separation between moderate losses and big losses.
n this case, there is no change in experts’ behaviour with regards to
he size of adjustment after a wrong direction adjustment (H1). This
ndicates that differentiating between moderate losses and big losses
as enhanced our understanding of forecaster behaviour.
In addition, directional analysis has been performed in order to
heck if there are any differences in experts’ behaviour after a big
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Table 5
Average forecasting performance for various previous β values and current adjustments’ sizes.
βt−1 (type of adjustment at t − 1)
Adjustment size at t
L wrong
direction
Moderate loss
or gain XL overshoot Any type
βt−1 < −1 −1 ≤ βt−1 ≤ 3 βt−1 > 3 βt−1 ∈ R
Small AvgRelMAE 1.052 0.989 1.009 0.999
n 1331 7075 690 9096
Large AvgRelMAE 1.144 0.981 1.119 1.011
n 736 3357 455 4548
Very large AvgRelMAE 1.331 0.997 1.331 1.070
n 870 3165 513 4548
Any size AvgRelMAE 1.156 0.983 1.118 1.021
n 2937 13597 1658 18192
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poss that was the result of a positive or a negative adjustment. While
enerally big losses are observed more frequently after positive ad-
ustments (a result that corroborates with Fildes et al. (2009)), there
re no signiﬁcant differences in subsequent experts’ behaviour linked
ith the direction of the adjustment at the previous period. In both
ases, positive and negative adjustments that resulted in big losses
t period t − 1 are more likely to be followed by another big loss at
eriod t, as the result of a large or very large adjustment, contrary to
he direction suggested by the previous error.
So, to address the ﬁrst research question, following big losses, ex-
erts are more likely to make large judgmental adjustments in the
pposite direction to the previous large error. Also, it is more likely
hat these adjustments will lead once again to another big loss.
.5. Forecasting performance
Table 5 presents the performance of the experts forecasts (judg-
entally adjusted statistical forecasts). This is provided for the dif-
erent values of β at period t − 1 that refer to the various types of
udgmental adjustments occurred in the previous period. Moreover,
he results are presented separately for each group with regards to
he size of adjustments at time t. The forecasting performance is
easured in terms of accuracy by the Average Relative Mean Abso-
ute Error (AvgRelMAE). As mentioned in Section 3, this error mea-
ure benchmarks the performance of the expert forecasts compar-
ng it directly to that of the statistical forecasts. Values lower than
nity denote improvement in performance compared to the bench-
ark, while values greater than one indicate deterioration in forecast
ccuracy. The AvgRelMAE is applied after considering a symmetric
rimmed mean so that any extreme values are eliminated, as sug-
ested by Davydenko and Fildes (2013). We opt for a 2 percent trim-
ing level.
The ﬁrst observation is that for this speciﬁc data set, judgmental
djustments are overall worse by 2.1 percent compared to the statis-
ical benchmark. This result agrees with previous research by Franses
nd Legerstee (2010). A possible explanation for this is that managers
ay not always have domain knowledge that needs to be incorpo-
ated in the system forecasts but just interfere to take control and
wnership of the forecasts. The “illusion of control” is a well known
isadvantage in management judgment (Kottemann et al., 1994). In
rder to have a more clear view about this statistic, let us focus on
he different groups with regards to the type of adjustment made at
ime t − 1 as measured by the β coeﬃcient.
We observe that after a moderate gain or loss (−1 ≤ βt−1 ≤ 3) ex-
erts’ interventions lead to improving the statistical forecasts by 1.7
ercent on average. This improvement is even larger (5.1 percent) if
e further analyse the data focusing on the cases where adjustments
t time t follow a gain at t − 1 (0 ≤ βt−1 ≤ 2). On the other hand,
he average value of AvgRelMAE is signiﬁcantly higher than unity
or the judgmental adjustments that follow big losses. In fact, thesedjustments are on average 14.2 percent worse than the statistical
orecasts. Also, while the deterioration occurs for any sizes of ad-
ustments, the value of the AvgRelMAE increases together with the
ize of adjustment after a big loss. This indicates that very large ad-
ustments after big losses resulted in signiﬁcant losses in forecasting
erformance.
So, experts’ large-sized adjustments after big losses may signiﬁ-
antly hurt forecast accuracy. As such, it is of critical importance that
e try to reduce, eliminate or adjust the interventions made after big
osses. We will try to address this in the next section by controlling
nd correcting the experts’ behaviour.
. Supporting forecasters’ behaviour
So far we have shown through a very large database that big losses
n judgmental adjustments negatively affect forecasters’ behaviour.
he obvious next step is how can we limit these negative effects
r even take advantage of them. In this section, we introduce some
trategies as to support the forecasters’ behaviour with regards to
udgmental interventions occurring after big losses.
We identify three simple strategies that could be potentially ap-
lied in such cases
• Guidance. Given that the judgmental adjustments are per-
formed within a specialised computer software (Forecast-
ing Support System or FSS), users could be exposed to in-
formation with regards to their past performance. In addi-
tion, they could be advised not to perform any correcting
actions (interventions) when producing forecasts for periods
that follow big losses as a result from experts’ adjustments,
as these have empirically shown to lead to decreased fore-
casting performance. Decisional guidance for support systems
has been previously suggested in the literature (for example
see Silver, 1991; Sauter, 1997; Goodwin, Fildes, Lawrence, &
Nikolopoulos, 2007).
• Restrictiveness. This strategy suggests that any judgmental
interventions should be simply disregarded. In other words,
the ﬁnal forecast should be equal to the statistical forecast,
αt = 0 in Eq. (2). This suggests that we assume the expert
forecast does not provide any additional insights (βt = ±∞).
When implemented into a FSS, managers should (by default)
not be able to intervene at all on the statistical outputs after
big-losses periods.
• 50 percent statistics + 50 percent judgment. This strategy is
also known as the Blattberg–Hoch approach and is based on
the argument that “any combinations of forecasts proves more
accurate than the single inputs” (Blattberg & Hoch, 1990). As
such, this strategy suggests the use of unconditional 50–50
percent weights applied for linearly combining statistical and
judgmental inputs. From Eq. (2), α should be simply replaced
with 0.5 for all periods t; equivalently, as suggested by Eq. (7),
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Table 6
Average forecasting performance for different correction strategies.
Correction strategy After a big loss
After L wrong
direction
After XL
overshoot Overall
Current practice 1.142 1.156 1.118 1.021
Guidance1 1.077 1.083 1.064 1.006
Restrictiveness 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.989
50 percent statistics + 50 percent judgment 0.965 0.979 0.938 0.981
1 Assuming that the adjustment was prevented in 50% of the cases.
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athe ex-ante prediction for β t is 2 for any future period. The
Blattberg–Hoch approach by deﬁnition works on sets of fore-
casts that have been independently produced. In the case of
judgmental adjustments, though, it acts as a dampener on the
adjustments (Fildes et al., 2009). As such, it might be beneﬁ-
cial when managers tend to over-adjust, as it is the case after
big losses. In any case, it has shown promising performance
when applied for combining statistical and expert forecasts
(Fildes et al., 2009; Franses & Legerstee, 2011a). While Franses
and Legerstee (2011a) applied it unconditionally on the same
database examined in this study, Fildes et al. (2009) identiﬁed
positive adjustments as those beneﬁting from the 50–50 per-
cent strategy. Here we focus on the application of this strategy
strictly after big losses, which are found to be linked with large
adjustments at the next period.
Table 6 presents the forecasting performance when each one of
the aforementioned strategies (column 1) is applied to the judgmen-
tal adjustments following big losses. The performance of the current
practice (no action in correcting adjustments after big losses) is pro-
vided as well. The forecasting performance is measured in terms of
AvgRelMAE. Apart from providing the results generally after a big
loss independently of its direction (column 2), we also distinguish
between big losses as a result of a large wrong direction adjustment
and extra-large overshoots (columns 3 and 4, respectively). Finally,
the last column provides the overall accuracy, measured as the Av-
gRelMAE across all periods, when the proposed strategy is applied
only to the periods after a big loss. In other words, it presents the im-
provements in the overall forecasting performance when taking ac-
tions only after an expert adjustment that resulted in a very large
forecast error compared to the statistical forecast.
Assuming that the judgmental adjustment was prevented by ap-
propriate guidance and advice in 50 percent of the cases, the ﬁrst
strategy essentially halves the difference in the performance between
expert forecasts and the benchmark (statistical forecasts). Generally,
the improvement in the forecasting performance as a result of the
guidance strategy can be regarded as a function of the percentage
of managers that essentially follow the provided advice. At the same
time, the guidance (after big losses) strategy leads to 1.5 percent im-
provement of the judgmental adjustments overall compared to the
current practice.
Restrictiveness, as expected, results in values of 1 for the AvgRel-
MAE after a big loss. It is very interesting, however, that when this
strategy is applied, the overall performance of experts’ interventions
is for the ﬁrst time positive (AvgRelMAE = 0.989), improving the rel-
ative performance of statistical forecasts by 1.1 percent overall.
Last but not least, the Blattberg–Hoch 50–50 percent approach
seems to work best for this data set. By applying an equal weight
combination of statistics and experts, we end up with ﬁnal fore-
casts that are up to 16 percent better than the expert forecasts The
approach also delivers improvements over the statistical forecasts
demonstrating there is value in the judgmental adjustments. In-
creases in accuracy are more substantial after an extra-large over-
shoot, where, as shown in Section 4.3, it is more probable that
another extra-large overshoot will occur in the next period. Theampening of these overshoots most likely leads to ﬁnal forecasts
ith β < 2, meaning gains in forecast accuracy. It is worth mention-
ng that this strategy improves almost 2/3 of the adjustments after
ig losses.
So, to address the second research question, by taking simple cor-
ective actions for just the 1/4 of the judgmental interventions (the
nes made after big losses), not only are we able to tackle the poor
erformance following such adjustments, but also to improve the
verall forecasting performance by 4 percent compared to the cur-
ent practice (from 1.021 to 0.981, according to Table 6). This trans-
ates into an improvement in the performance relative to statistical
orecasts of 1.9 percent.
. Concluding remarks
Judgmental adjustments of statistical forecasts are very common
n companies and other organisations. However, the integration of
eld knowledge and soft data through judgment is not always per-
ormed in the most effective way. As a result, judgmental interven-
ions do not always lead to improved accuracy and in some cases such
djustments lead to signiﬁcant performance losses. Thus, it is im-
ortant for organisations to understand the conditions under which
udgmental adjustments are more likely to fail.
This paper focuses on the cases where judgmental adjustments
re made after signiﬁcant accuracy losses have resulted from adjust-
ents made in the previous period. After deﬁning a new measure
or interpreting the type, magnitude and quality of judgmental ad-
ustments, we examined, through a large empirical data set, the be-
aviour of forecasters after performing adjustments that led to big
osses. We showed that the probability of performing an adjustment
hat leads to big loss increases in a period following one where a big
oss has already occurred. Despite the earlier loss the probability of
aking a large adjustment in the opposite direction to the one sug-
ested by the previous forecasts error also increases following a big
oss. After a big loss forecasters have a propensity to persist in their
elief that similar large changes to the statistical forecast are needed
espite evidence from outcome feedback that the previous change
ed to lower accuracy. This appears to be because forecasters are pre-
ared to make repeated bold adjustments based on inaccurate infor-
ation. Explanations based on asymmetric loss, the gambler’s fallacy
rmisjudging the timing of the effects to special events were not sup-
orted by the data. In terms of forecast accuracy, these adjustments
roduced forecasts that were on average 14 percent worse than that
f statistical methods alone.
Simple correction strategies, such as guidance, restrictiveness and
nweighted combination of statistical and expert forecasts, can be
pplied to improve the forecasting performance after big losses. In
act, we recorded improvements of up to 16 percent for these peri-
ds. The overall gain in accuracy is 4 percent and this is coming from
djusting further just a quarter of the total number of adjustments.
iven the simplicity of the proposed strategies, this result is of prac-
ical importance.
The phenomenon identiﬁed here potentially applies to other oper-
tional situations. Its essential feature is of experts misunderstanding
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Ohe outcome feedback they receive and repeating the same mis-
akes. For example, a review of the behavioural newsvendor type
xperiments in the context of examining medical operations room
cheduling shows repetitive error prone behaviour despite feedback
Wachtel & Dexter, 2010). There is also evidence of experimental par-
icipants rejecting models in favour of their own (mis)judgments
ven when given evidence on the superior performance of models
Dietvorst, Simmons, & Massey, 2015). As Hämäläinen et al. (2013)
emark, a key issue of behavioural OR is “how to help people ﬁnd
etter strategies” in problem-solving situations, overcoming the bi-
ses that typically intrude. In the light of our results we would add
hat this should incorporate how to design Desicion Support Systems
or, in the context of this article, Forecasting Support Systems) to pro-
ide that effective support so that feedback from systems is used to
ts best advantage.
Future paths for research include the exploration of more so-
histicated strategies for manipulating the adjustments made af-
er big losses. For example, the use of error bootstrap rules (Fildes
t al., 2009) or correlation with experts experience and/or behaviour
Franses & Legerstee, 2011a) could be considered as alternatives. The
trategy of responding to big losses could be thought of as a sim-
le monitoring scheme which could be compared to regular meth-
ds of monitoring such as tracking signals (Gorr & Ord, 2009). The
ethod proposed in this paper using β t is volatile so comparison
ith smoothed tracking signals would be valuable. Another critical
uestion for future research is to examine if the automatic adjust-
ent of judgmental adjustments (through a combination of statisti-
al and expert forecasts, or dampening of the experts’ adjustments)
ould lead to a long-term change of forecasters’ behaviour with re-
ards to how they perform judgmental interventions. To that end, a
ossibility for future research would be to examine the effectiveness
f providing feedback on adjustments that led to big losses, as explicit
eedback to experts on their performance has been shown to lead to
ore accurate forecasts (Legerstee & Franses, 2014).
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